

Conference Report

The Fourth Citizens
Continental Conference on the
12th African Union Summit

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 and 17 January 2009

Acknowledgements

Funders: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, FIDH, International Refugee Rights Initiative,
Institute for security Studies, Open Society Institute, Oxfam, Trust Africa

Contents

Acronyms	v
Background	vi
Opening session	1
Overview of keys issues on the continent	3
Prospects and challenges for the establishment of a Union Government of Africa	3
Overview of peace and security in Africa	4
Conflict area case studies	7
The eastern DRC: what can be done?	7
The situation in Somalia	9
The situation in Zimbabwe	10
The situation in Darfur	11
General comment on CSO engagement with the AU	12
The Social Policy Framework	12
CSO coordination	16
Discussions and recommendations	16
Closing session and adoption of CSO communiqué	18
Participants	19

Acronyms

ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia	ISS	Institute of Security Studies
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia	LRA	Lord Resistance Army, Uganda
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women	MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
CePSERD	Centre for Peace Building and Socio- Economic Resources Development, Nigeria	MDC	Movement for Democratic Change, Zimbabwe
CNDP	Congr�s Nationale pour la Defense du Peuple, DRC	NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
CSO	Civil society organisations	NGO	Non-governmental organisations
CCP-AU	Centre for Citizens' Participation in the African Union	OAU	Organisation of African Unity
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the Congolese People	OSJE	Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	PCRD	Post-conflict reconstruction and development
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council, African Union	PSC	AU Peace and Security Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	REC	Regional Economic Communities
FARDC	Forces Arm�es de la R�publique D�mocratique du Congo	SADC	Southern African Development Community
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights	SPF	Social Policy Framework
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda	TFG	Transitional Federal Government, Somalia
ICC	International Criminal Court	UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
IDP	Internally displaced people	UNHCR	Office of the UN Health Commissioner for Refugees
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Background

The Fourth Citizens' Continental Conference was held on 16 and 17 January 2009 ahead of the 12th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on Civil society organisations and African Union (CSO-AU) partnership, and

engagement to alleviate pressing issues in Africa. The conference was attended by about 70 participants from some 20 African countries, including representatives from the Diaspora.



Opening session

Mr Desire Assogbavi, Pan-Africa Senior Policy Analyst, Oxfam Liaison Office with the AU, opened the conference by extending recognition to partners whose commitment had made the conference a reality. He emphasised the need for CSOs to be involved in the deliberations and decision-making processes of the AU, and in particular their role of acting as a voice for local populations, with whom they should cooperate actively and closely. He urged each participant to engage actively in the conference since one of its aims was for the discourse to result in the development of a workable communiqué for the AU Summit.

The welcome speech was delivered by Ms Yemisrach Kebede, Director, Centre for Citizens' Participation in the African Union (CCP-AU). After acknowledging the partner organisations whose support had enabled the CCP-AU to arrange the conference, she defined the CCP-AU as an informal platform established through the combined efforts of Ethiopian CSOs and international NGOs to enable engagement with the AU. She expressed the hope that there would be active participation in the form of questions, comments and feedback as this would enrich the process and build everyone's knowledge base.

Referring to the structure of the conference, Ms Kebede said that the incorporation of expert working groups was a slight departure from previous conferences. The CCP-AU had organised the conference with the aim of challenging CSO representatives and to build on what had been achieved thus far. The programme for the first day would include presentations presided over by experts and the outcome would be recommendations for discussion and adoption by the plenary. The second day would focus on the work of the CCP-AU. The resulting communiqué would be used in CCP-AU scheduled visits to country capitals prior to the summit. Ms Kebede commended

the official launch of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as an organ for CSO participation in the AU, but also referred to the complications involved in becoming eligible for joining ECOSOCC, which was a major setback.

Mr Manyawkal Mekonnen, Executive Director of the Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE), referred to the unique nature of the conference, which had brought together African CSOs that engaged with the AU to a varying degree, and others who were interested in strengthening their networks across the continent. He drew attention to the renewal of the AU's commitment to work closely with CSOs, in this way recognising the importance of effective partnerships between national governments and CSOs. He discussed the role of ECOSOCC as the only official bridge between the AU and CSOs, which now had the responsibility of driving the agenda of the continental body and bringing the demands of the African people to the attention of the AU. This was quite a change from the approach adopted by the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU), where decision-making had been left solely in the hands of heads of state. He confirmed, however, that ECOSOCC was impaired by challenges that rendered it partly ineffective.

Mr Mekonnen criticised the AU for not having taken an active role in facilitating engagement with CSOs. The AU had failed to give adequate emphasis to CSOs because of so-called misconceptions. However, insufficient coordination among CSOs had also been a contributing factor for the slow development of relations between the AU and civil society. He cautioned against the notion that the AU alone was responsible for alleviating the problems of Africa in terms of initiating discourse and taking adequate action; CSOs as well should engage in the process

of linking the continent's citizens and the AU. The CCP-AU, backed by founding organisations like OSJE, was in the lead of these efforts.

Referring to the new Societies and Charities Law of Ethiopia, Mr Mekonnen mentioned the displeasure of some Ethiopian CSOs with the law because of its debilitating effect on them and the manner in which it reduced the effectiveness of the projects they intended to accomplish. He urged CSOs to work together and develop strategies that would enable them to deal with pressing issues in a sequential manner. Overlaps and setbacks would affect the establishment of a strong link between African citizens and the AU. At the end of his presentation, he thanked the

organizers of the conference, and stressed the importance of participants engaging effectively so as to strengthen a people-centred AU.

Mr Assogbavi subsequently briefed participants on the upcoming 12th Heads of State Summit, which would have the theme 'Infrastructure development for Africa' and would focus predominantly on transport, energy and investment. The summit intended to adopt a declaration on the theme. However, the current situations in Guinea, the eastern DRC, Somalia, Darfur and Zimbabwe, which affected peace and security in Africa, and the much anticipated discussion on the formation of the Union Government of Africa would no doubt dominate the agenda, he said.

Overview of key issues on the continent

The chairperson for the morning session, Mr Ayokunle Fagbemi, Executive Director of the Centre for Peace Building and Socio-Economic Resources Development (CePSERD), Nigeria, stated that the first presentations would assess what had been accomplished as regards discussions on a union government of Africa and peace and security on the continent.

Prospects and challenges for the establishment of a union government of Africa

Mr Ibrahima Kane, *AU Advocacy Director, Open Society Institute*, briefly outlined the proposal for a Union Government of Africa. The proposal marked a step forward in establishing union amongst African people and Africans living outside the continent. The Accra Declaration on Union Government was adopted by the AU in Ghana in July 2007 and had the aim of initiating a 'Grand Debate' that would develop the idea of such a government. The endeavour to establish African unity originally stemmed from an idea set forth by Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana. The AU undertook to render support for the establishment of a union government, as well as looking into the challenges that could be expected to arise. Mr Kane cautioned about the necessity to consider the difficulties when envisaging a union government for the whole of Africa, given the challenges posed by those countries that should, in fact, act as pillars for unification.

The intention with the African integration projected was not only limited to social and economic aspects, but had a political dimension as well. It was realised that with

increasing globalisation, countries standing alone were fragile, and there was also a strong provision for integrating the Diaspora in the process. It was understood that it would be important to adopt coordination and harmonisation measures to ensure the smooth-functioning of the union, and that a commitment for support and contribution would have to be made by each individual member country. The models of integration to be used had to be drawn from Africa and not copied from unions in other parts of the world in order for a union government to cope with African realities through collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). According to Mr Kane, Africa was not short of guidelines when it came to the creation of a union government. One such guideline was the African Charter. A union government would have to be backed by principles of good governance, respect for human rights, peace and security, and poverty alleviation, amongst others.

Mr Kane discussed the issues delaying the materialisation of a union. The most important of these was the fact that some AU member states had not yet reached consensus about the institutional components of a union. However, the committee in charge of the process had identified nine areas for priority consideration for example infrastructure, health, etc... Other areas requiring attention would be incorporated gradually. Another unresolved question concerned the sovereignty of individual states under a union government. There was considerable difference of opinion on this between Anglophone and Francophone countries. Mr Kane applauded countries that had incorporated clauses in their national constitutions that provided for the possibility of compromising on some sovereignty under a union government. A third difficulty affecting the formation of a union government was

the position of RECs, eight of which were formally recognised by the AU. The issue became particularly difficult when countries were members of more than one REC as each REC required an allocation of resources and time to deal with similar issues in each forum. A union government forum would increase the burden even further.

Financial issues also greatly affected the institutionalisation of a union government. Mr Kane illustrated this by pointing out that 55 per cent of the annual budget of the AU came from North Africa. Such a skewed contribution subjected the organisation to inordinate influence by a minority of members. A union government would most likely suffer the same fate. In his view, the AU was strictly not an example for integration, pointing to the lack of clarity of the decisions and principles that were being endorsed by the AU. Another hindrance was the challenge encountered in making the AU a people-centred organisation. Mr Kane also expressed concern about the lack of mechanisms to check whether member states were in fact advocating the idea of a union government which was envisaged to fill the gap that existed currently between the citizens of Africa and institutions like the AU. For integration to occur on the African continent, the first necessary step was for the people to understand what was meant by a union. As far as Mr Kane was concerned, the process of integration in Africa was still at a very rudimentary stage.

Mr Kane challenged his audience by asking participants about the extent of networking being undertaken by them to promote formation of a union. In general, the people in African were rather critical about the formation of an African government. The question also arose whether it was indeed possible for people to consider a union in those countries where democracy was challenged. Mr Kane asked how it was possible for a union government to be considered when situations arose such as the expulsion of hundreds of Malians from Libya in November 2008, an act that completely contradicted the idea of a 'United Africa' so strongly advocates by the Libyan President Gaddafi.

Overview of peace and security in Africa

The second presentation was made by Mr Kenneth Mpyisi, Director of the Addis Ababa office of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS). He gave a synopsis of African peace and security achievements in 2008 and the expectations for 2009. In his view, contradictory processes of state consolidation and state erosion had become the norm in 2008.

Recently, there had also been a shift from large-scale open warfare to pockets of small-scale, but destructive conflicts, he said.

Peace and security in Africa had continued to be challenged by the re-emergence of conflict in areas such as the eastern DRC, and the ongoing conflict in Somalia, which had adversely affected the prospects for peace in those regions. He spoke about the positive effects of Africa's incorporation into the global arena and the negative effects of that could come about as a result of foreign involvement in Africa by those countries. In terms of Africa's economic achievements, he noted the occurrence of considerable regional disparities.

African elections in 2008 had had unexpected and unprecedented outcomes. For example in Kenya, where the dispute that had developed following the announcement of the results had culminated in the death and displacement of thousands of people, but was then resolved by the praiseworthy mediation efforts of the former UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan. The political changes that were introduced in order to reconcile the contending parties had created a new term to capture the essence of this type of engagement, namely 'deviant democratic experiments'.

Mr Mpyisi then discussed selected regions to illustrate the challenges that had been faced with regard to peace and security. The first was North Africa, where some countries had enjoyed economic upswings because of the boom in commodities, but which were at the same time faced by insecurity, especially in urban areas, with civilian populations becoming victims of bombings and kidnappings. An example was Algeria, where terrorists with bases in the Maghreb region and actively masterminded by Al-Qaeda, became very active in 2008.

In the Horn of Africa, instability had continued in central and southern Somalia, and the Darfur region of Sudan. Large population displacements had occurred and there were no signs of the conflicts ending in the immediate future owing to the activities of rebel groups with varying causes and reasons for taking up arms. Border disputes in this region had also resumed, for example between Eritrea and Djibouti. Concerning West Africa, Mr Mpyisi looked at the difficulties states in the region were continuing to face since the cessation of conflicts, which were being compounded by the global financial crisis. The political scene was also being challenged by unfavourable developments, for example in Mauritania, where an elected government was ousted in a military coup, and in Guinea, where the death of President Lansana Conté

resulted in a military takeover, although the military junta had at least indicated its intention to hold elections in 2010. These would need to be monitored by the AU in order to ensure their success.

The situation in Central Africa was dominated by developments in the eastern DRC, where mediation efforts had repeatedly failed and various agreements had been broken. Also in 2008, the government in Chad just survived an attempt to dispose it and the president of Cameroon had assumed a third term of office, which shattered any remaining hope for a democratic process in that country.

Post-election violence in East Africa became known as the 'Kenyan Solution' based on events that happened during the mediations, while prospects for resolving the conflict in northern Uganda were marred by a last-minute failure to sign a peace agreement, which resulted in joint action by Sudan, Uganda and the DRC to capture Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group. In reprisal, the LRA continued to commit atrocities among civilian populations in the three countries. It was also apparent that President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda would compete in the presidential elections for a fourth term of office.

As regards the Southern African region, Mr Mpyisi noted the forced resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in South Africa and the crisis in Zimbabwe, where efforts to generate solutions had been grossly undermined by the ruling party's rampant abuse of political power and the violation of human rights. Public opinion differed on the question whether the recent election process in Angola had been free and fair. In Swaziland, which tended not to be much in the public eye, indications of denial of political space were increasingly apparent as it was quite clear that the prime minister was intent on running for office for a fourth time.

On the prospects for 2009, Mr Mpyisi held that there would be not much change in the political manifestations prevalent in Africa. Unfortunately, there seemed to be very little that was changing or was improving. The peace and security situation in Africa remained the same or was even worsening, with the areas involved in conflict increasing in number and the incidents growing in magnitude. To deal with the various situations effectively, the AU, with the assistance of the international community, would need to take the lead in efforts developed to alleviate Africa's problems.

In his opinion, the situation in the eastern DRC would continue for a long time, given the complexity of the

conflicting parties' demands. With respect to Sudan, the new Obama administration would play a vital role in the process, but it was likely that the proposed southern Sudan referendum would be postponed. In Somalia, a new and even more complex balance of internal forces would determine the immediate future following withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. Mr Mpyisi stressed the need to address the issues of peace and security affecting African countries. These efforts, he suggested, should start at national levels within local contexts, with the aim of expanding them regionally and, eventually, to the wider continent.

Discussions and recommendations

- There is a need for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) upon the termination of armed conflict, but such action can be avoided if the AU embarks on early conflict prevention based on the principle of Responsibility to Protect, which has three main components, namely the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.
- To resolve conflicts, the AU should develop an interlocking system of peacekeeping with the UN, but also assure the maintenance of peace and stability.
- There is a need to formulate channels through which CSOs can work with the AU on matters of peace and security; a document called the 'Livingstone Formula' has been released by the AU to formalise and enhance CSO engagement with the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC).
- The democratisation of countries would alleviate many problems that citizens face, since good governance, proper succession and other democratic principles would become part of national behaviour.
- Progress towards achieving a union government for Africa is hampered by the failure of AU member states to disseminate relevant information about the proposals within their countries. Such information would enable the public to engage in the debate that is currently dominated by heads of state and governments.
- AU member states appear to be unwilling to fund the AU adequately. With sufficient funding the AU could become a powerful agent for change and in that way affect the interests of its members positively.
- Funding of a union government and any other organ of the AU could be achieved by generating income in Africa at the local level, as proposed by the Council of Ministers. A levy of 0.2 per cent, for insurance

payments, airline tickets, real estate transactions, mortgages, mobile telephones etc., would bring in the necessary funding. A good example is ECOWAS, which is the only regional African body that operates from funds purely generated at the local level.

- Effective integration can only be realised when issues between countries are resolved and integration within countries is realised. It is important to look at imposed restrictions on the movement of people within African regions.

Conflict area case studies

The eastern DRC: what can be done?

The speakers on the eastern DRC included Mrs Hemedi Lysette Banza, President of Dignite des Sans Voix, DRC, Mr Kitengue Dismas, Vice president of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Ms Djuma Shada, Societe Civile Congolaise, and Ms Abdellaoui Jamila, Senior Researcher, ISS, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Mrs Banza highlighted the suffering of Congolese women in the conflict in the eastern DRC, as documented by her organisation. She gave a brief background to the evolution of the conflict, the parties involved, and the failed peace and ceasefire agreements. Although the conflict was characterised as a Great Lakes Region problem, she emphasised the implications of the conflict for peace and security at a continental level. Concerning the impact of the conflict on the civilian population, the years 1998 to 2003 had been by far the worst. A particularly bad incident was the Kiwanza Massacre in northern Kivu province, when civilians were shot dead



in their homes by rebel forces headed by General Laurent Nkunda, thereby breaching the ceasefire agreement he had signed earlier.

According to Mrs Banza, the multi-party elections held in the DRC in 2006 had resulted in widespread optimism, but these expectations continued to be dampened. The consequences of the conflict for the population were the excessive recruitment of child soldiers, the killing of unarmed civilians for no concrete reason, sexual and physical violence against women, and the fact that the perpetrators had not yet been brought to justice. She questioned the failure of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to protect Congolese civilians against rebel forces in the Kiwanza massacre even though it had an armed force of 17 000 personnel on the ground.

Mrs Banza listed the following requirements for bringing about change to the conflict in the eastern DRC:

- More effective dialogues than in the past had to be held to generate concrete outcomes.
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC had to be generated and an end should be brought to the plundering of the country's resources.
- Western countries could make a significant contribution considering that the conflicting parties were not only based in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, but also included multi-national corporations pursuing specific interests in the country.
- The international community should give due attention and recognition to the impact of the conflict in Eastern DRC.
- The current chairperson of the AU should visit the eastern DRC in person to observe the situation and

gain first-hand experience of the dire state of the region's population.

- Due consideration should be given to the provisions for tackling Rwandan rebels operating in the region contained in the 2008 Amani Programme plan of action drafted by CSOs based in the DRC.
- MONUC operations in the area should be strengthened.
- Care had to be taken that war criminals captured in the eastern DRC were not given amnesty.

The next presenter, Mr Kitengue Dismas, gave an analysis of the situation in the eastern DRC and characterised the conflict as having two dimensions, an internal and an external one. Internal factors included the resurgence of armed conflict as a result of the DRC's failure to develop an effective national army, bad governance, corruption, the impunity with which perpetrators could commit violence and the lack of effective administrative structures. External factors included the non-resolution of the situation as regards Rwandan refugees who had sought refuge in DRC and remained a factor of instability, and the ongoing operations by rebel forces from the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, the latter two using the eastern DRC as a battle ground.

Lack of government authority in the area of south Kivu was seen as a major factor for the continuation of anarchy. The conflicting parties included the national army of the DRC, rebel groups, such as the Congr s Nationale pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), local militia groups and foreign instigators, namely multi-national corporations interested in the country's abundant natural resources. The conflict was essentially fuelled by geo-political factors- the region's rich resources base, the fragile state institutions that were unable to control mineral resource exploitation, and the relatively large number of interests involved in the conflict. To Mr Kitengue it was apparent that MONUC was under-resourced and overwhelmed by the situation. Its limited actions had failed to protect civilians and thus rendered its interventions unsatisfactory.

Mr Kitengue made the following suggestions:

- The AU should support CSOs operating in the DRC since these had remained neutral in the main and acted in the interest of the local population.
- A 'platform of cooperation' should be created to allow CSOs in the DRC to cooperate with CSOs in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

- The AU should develop and adopt resolutions to help resolve the conflict and support peace efforts in the region.
- Mechanisms should be developed to sanction war criminals and instigators of violence.

The third presenter on the DRC was Ms Djuma Shada. After a brief overview of the background to the conflict, she referred to the inability of MONUC to deal with the situation on the ground and to protect civilians as required by its mandate. She supported the claim that the conflict in the eastern DRC was destabilising the country and making it an easy prey for natural resource exploitation. The parties involved in the plundering of resources had no consideration for the plight of the Congolese people and the effects of their engagement on the inhabitants of the area. According to her, the conflict had already claimed the lives of many people while about 2 million had been displaced.

Since independence in 1960, the DRC had witnessed a recurrence of conflict founded on the plunder of its immense natural wealth both by internal (in this case local government) and external (multi-national companies, mercenaries, rebels etc) interests. According to Ms Djuma, questions had to be asked about what was being done by African and international groups such as the AU, the EU, the UN, the Commission for Human Rights and the International Criminal Court to resolve the conflict. Many decisions had been adopted worldwide, but their practical implementation had left much to be desired.

The last presenter was Ms Abdellaoui Jamila. The conflict in the eastern DRC, which she characterised as Africa's 'First World War', involved six countries, namely the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. After giving a brief account of the important events that had taken place in the DRC since 1999, she focused her presentation on the period after the elections in 2006, which had provided a sense of stability, even though conflict was still prevalent in the east. Despite agreements between the conflicting groups – the Nairobi and Goma Agreements of November 2007 and January 2008 respectively – war had again broke out between groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Congr s Nationale pour la Defense du Peuple, DRC (CNDP).

Ms Jamila said that MONUC had two major mandates, which, according to Security Council Resolution 1756 of 2007, included to 'Support operations led by Forces Arm es de la R publique D mocratique du Congo

(FARDC) in Eastern DRC to disarm recalcitrant local and foreign armed groups’, and ‘Use all necessary means ... to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical violence’. To the reasons for the conflict mentioned by earlier presenters, she added lack of capacity by the army of the DRC, the absence of an effective management system for natural resources in the region, then absence of a political solution for citizenship issues, inter-community tensions, land tenure issues, lack of mechanisms to ensure the deliverance of justice and reconciliation, and the return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

The presenter put forth some suggestions as a way to resolving the conflict, including the need for anyone analysing the situation in the eastern DRC to be realistic. In her view, military action to solve the conflict was not working. There was a need for strong external-force engagement, while Rwanda should support the current proposal to incorporate the CNDP into the DRC government. Open discussion and dialogue between the conflicting parties was very important.

Commenting on questions posed after previous presentations, Ms Abdellaoui noted that without security in the land, it would be difficult to bring criminals to justice. Hence it was important to regard peace and security in the region as a pre-condition for implementing justice, and also for CSOs in DRC to make themselves influential in decisions made by the AU.

Discussion and recommendations

- There is a need to fight corruption in the DRC, as well as giving due consideration to the predominance of natural resource exploitation.
- CSOs operating in the DRC should exert pressure on forthcoming negotiations to ensure a successful outcome.
- DRC civil society should lobby the AU to develop strategic plans and solutions, and to assert its authority.
- It is necessary to address the ‘post-conflict dividend’, namely the development of strategies to deal with the displaced population, as well as infrastructural, economic, social and all other forms of development.
- The questions of citizenship in the case of communities rounded up to join rebel groups (i.e. General Nkunda’s group) have to be addressed.
- Adequate consideration has to be given to plans to ensure effective resource allocation.

- Provision has to be made to protect people who give evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) about perpetrators of violence and abuse.
- There should be a check on the media to ensure that information produced on the situation in the eastern DRC is based on fact.
- It is necessary to ensure that the gender dimension of conflict management is observed so that women are able to participate equally in the peace process.
- The cultural context of the conflict should be assessed and traditional modes of conflict resolution for mitigating the situation should be considered.
- Peacekeeping task forces should be strengthened and so that they can provide protection for the civilian population.
- Even though there is concern about the possible impact of an increase in MONUC forces on the conflict, given its poor performance to date, its capabilities should be strengthened.

The situation in Somalia

Mr Roba Sharamo- Programme Head, ISS, Addis Ababa, made a presentation on the war that has been raging in Somalia for 18 years. He acknowledged and applauded the efforts of ‘brave’ peacekeeping forces stationed there against a backdrop of incessant insurgency from rebel groups, before commenting briefly on engagement by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to



achieve an end to the civil war and to stabilise Somalia. The following steps were taken by IGAD:

- October 2004: The TFG is created under the auspice of IGAD.
- October 2008: The Nairobi Declaration is adopted at the 13th Extraordinary IGAD Summit. Leaders of IGAD countries call for the ‘resolution of political deadlock and formation of a new cabinet’.
- November 2008: An Extraordinary IGAD Council of Ministers Meeting takes key decisions on the imposition of sanctions on ‘Somali peace spoilers’. IGAD is tasked to take responsibility for ensuring and enhancing contributions of manpower from African countries to strengthen the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Mr Sharamo said that although a peace agreement had been concluded between representatives of the TFG and its opposition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), in Djibouti in June 2008, international cooperation was required to put this into effect. Inadequate regional, continental and international support was hampering the peace process; there was too much rhetoric and too little action. The Djibouti Peace Process had been challenged by a key Islamist rebel leader, but had been welcomed by the Somali parliament. Differences in opinion between Somalia’s president and prime minister further hampered the peace process. In the opinion of Mr Sharamo the TFG was exhibiting failure to produce a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from

Somalia had been accompanied by the bombardment of the presidential palace and had resulted in civilian casualties. Since Somali factions had always been in conflict prior to the deployment of the Ethiopian force it was ‘debatable’ whether the fighting occurred as a consequence of the withdrawal or not.

Mr Sharamo noted the increasing number of Somalis who had been forced to flee the country as a result of the conflict. The elections in 2009 had been an important turning point as the new president had endorsed a commitment to resolve border disputes affecting the region. Further elections in 2009 would enhance a critical and decisive moment for Somalia, provided the elections did in fact take place as scheduled and were concluded successfully. ‘War mongers’ were profiting grossly from the continuation of the conflict, one expression of this being the piracy of Somali’s coast.

As a possible means forward, Mr Sharmo suggested the following:

- Political dialogue needed to be initiated between the conflicting groups.
- It was important to have a ‘muscular’ peacekeeping force operating on the ground in Somalia.
- The AU should join hands with IGAD member states to tame war profiteers, spoilers of the peace process and human rights abusers by imposing sanctions on key leaders and their associates.
- In collaboration with IGAD, the AU should lobby the international community not to pressurise the AU unduly



on meeting its peacekeeping commitments, but to come up with practical steps to strengthen AMISOM, or to create a hybrid AU-UN mission as envisaged in the March 2008 UN contingency plan for Somalia.

The situation in Zimbabwe

The presentation on Zimbabwe was made by Mrs Blessing Gorejena, Legal Practitioner, Public Interest Unit for Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. She began by saying that the situation in Zimbabwe was a 'crisis of governance' and not a conflict. However, this crisis was affecting the proper functioning of the country. Though seemingly a recent phenomenon, political violence and abuse had manifested itself in Zimbabwe for more than a decade, but had escalated and become more pronounced, gaining international attention, following the elections in March 2008. The political crisis in Zimbabwe was made worse by an economic crisis that manifested itself in the country suffering the highest inflation rate in the world. Corruption and the collapse of the country's social services sector, especially in the areas of health and education, added to the crisis.

Mrs Gorejena highlighted the problems encountered by humanitarian aid organisations, which provided basic necessities such as water, food and health care to 75 per cent of Zimbabwe's population. The worst was that their activities had on various occasions been politicised by the government authorities. The current cholera epidemic, the spread of which the government had failed to curtail because of a dire shortage of health professionals, had claimed the lives of thousands and was spreading to other countries in the region. To make the situation worse, about 80 per cent of Zimbabwe's population was currently unemployed and industrial production in the country could be characterised as being on the brink of cessation.

She said that the situation was made worse by the authorities' continuing use of brutality and force against political and civil activists. Human rights abuses and the violation of civil liberties had continued, an example being the abduction of the director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project, Jestina Mukoko, in December 2008. However, these measures had not managed to silence Zimbabwe's CSOs, as demonstrated, Mrs Gorejena said, by a recent street demonstration of doctors demanding better pay and the discontent displayed by members of the police force and the army. Mrs Gorejena discussed the 'optimism' that

had followed the political decision to embark on the development of mechanisms that would enable power sharing between the two political rivals, Mr Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Mr Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but that it had become increasingly frustrating the longer it took to finalise the agreement.

Mrs Gorejena emphasised the need to address the root causes of conflict. She questioned the future of Zimbabwe given all the problems facing the country and asked how the international community, especially the AU, could contribute to achieving a resolution and fulfilling their moral obligation to protect the citizens of Zimbabwe under the condition of the establishment having failed. She said that it was important to acknowledge the pressure that Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and other neighbouring countries was having on the CSOs operating in those countries. There was a proposal to prepare an 'audit' of the consequences of the cholera outbreak on neighbouring countries because of the transmission of the disease by Zimbabwean refugees. The limitations placed on international aid organisations attempting to operate in Zimbabwe should be looked at and every effort should be made to ease these in order to bring peace and security back to Zimbabwe.

The situation in Darfur

Mr Desire Assogbavi gave a brief background to the six-year-long Darfur conflict in western Sudan. In his view, the chances for an immediate, effective and lasting resolution to the conflict were grim. According to documentation recently received from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an additional 300 000 people had been displaced and about 4 million people needed humanitarian assistance. But organisations providing humanitarian assistance had been incapacitated by Sudanese government bureaucracy and the lack of peace and security in Darfur.

Mr Assogbavi also spoke about the fluctuating numbers of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as against that which had been mandated in Article 1769 of the United Nations Resolution on Darfur. One of the reasons for this state of affairs was the shortage of adequate logistics and equipment, as well as inadequate coordination to ensure the support of those countries that had committed

themselves to supplying personnel. If effectively deployed, UNAMID could contribute immensely to implementing and fostering peace and security in Darfur. Mr Assogbavi emphasised the need for African states to adopt mechanisms that would ensure peaceful conflict resolution rather than always considering military operations as a necessity for favourable conflict resolution in Africa.

In his concluding remarks, Mr Assogbavi said that it was important to pressurise the government of Sudan as well as the militias involved in the Darfur conflict to develop immediate and lasting solutions. It was also vital to address the problem between Sudan and Chad if peace and security were indeed to be restored to the area.

The second presentation on Darfur was made by Mr Dismas Nkunda, Director of the Darfur Consortium, which was founded in 2004 and has more than 50 member organisations. Among the various actions taken by the Darfur Consortium was the presentation of Darfur's case to the ICC. This had resulted in Sudanese government reprisals against the employees of the Darfur Consortium, including torture.

On the question of justice vs. security, Mr Nkunda addressed the possibility of Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir being indicted and a warrant of arrest being issued against him, which would result in strong government reaction. He questioned whether it would be possible for the international community to put a check on the government

in this regard. He further illustrated the government's violation of press freedom when it came to reporting on the situation in Darfur. To overcome this, Mr Nkunda suggested that NGOs collaborate amongst themselves to obtain information and to affect solutions in their areas of operations. An example of such collaboration was the work being done by the Arab Coalition, which disseminated factual information about the situation in Darfur to the Arab world. The efforts of the Arab Coalition had resulted in a change in Arab perceptions in contrast to the initial belief that the black population in Darfur had risen against the Arab population.

Discussion and recommendations

Questions were raised on how to strengthen the interaction of CSOs with the AU in order for the AU to be better advised about situations in African countries. With regard to Zimbabwe, the 'failure' of the AU to create a solution to that crisis was considered to be at least in part an outcome of the fact that the Southern African Development Community (SADC), characterised by some as a 'biased unethical broker', had projected itself as the only organ able to resolve the crisis effectively. It was suggested that CSOs engage in discourse on and express their views about Mr Thabo Mbeki's biases in the mediation process.

General comment on CSO engagement with the AU

There was general agreement among participants that it was vital to establish links between CSOs at national, continental and international levels to promote access to information and build strength that could enhance their capacity and influence. It was pointed out that previous CSO conferences, for example the 2008 Paris International Conference, had failed to address this issue. Other comments included the following:

- Governments of AU member states should take on the responsibility of observing more closely the resolutions, decisions and recommendations passed by the organisation. This would help to ensure that the AU becomes more powerful and influential.
- In cases of conflict it is vital that regional organisations become actively involved in the issue and do not leave the burden entirely to the AU
- CSOs, in collaboration with both local and foreign NGOs and other activists, should take a leading role in advocating and lobbying the priority issue of civilian protection. The goal would be to influence the decisions taken by the AU.
- Information about successful conflict resolution should be distributed continent-wide by CSOs so that experiences can be shared and strategies can be developed from these to resolve conflict elsewhere.
- CSOs should produce a 'declaration' to be presented to the AU on their commitment to and support for all individuals, groups or people engaged in defending human rights and humanitarian work.
- The AU should develop strategies to deal with potential reaction by the Sudanese government should President al-Bashir be indicted for human rights violations, and devise ways for the humanitarian organisations to continue operations in Darfur without concern.
- AU member states should bear in mind that without a resolution in Darfur there is a great likelihood of an adverse outcome to the proposed south-Sudan referendum.
- The AU should ensure that the UN arms embargo is implemented in Somalia.
- In order to achieve a peaceful resolution to African conflicts, it is necessary for governments to practice good governance and develop institutions that are accountable and put the interests of the civilian population first.
- The AU and SADC should jointly devise a resolution on Zimbabwe. The AU should then take responsibility for ensuring that the resolution is implemented by the Zimbabwean authorities.

Mr Assogbavi commented that the AU would need to support any decision the ICC took on President al-Bashir, since non-support would result in greater suffering by the people of Sudan. He further noted that there was lack of political will in Africa to check the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which were used extensively in African conflicts. He requested participants to extend the ideas on CSO engagement produced at the conference by developing national plans of action. He advocated that each CSO represented at the conference should produce a proposal in this regard for distribution to the media in their home countries and to their country representatives attending the 12th African Union Summit.

The Social Policy Framework (SPF)

Mr Chikezie Anyanwu, Africa Advocacy Advisor, Save the Children Alliance, gave a brief overview of meetings and discussions held regarding the draft AU Social Policy Framework in the beginning of his presentation. The idea for an African Social Policy Framework first developed at the inaugural ministerial meeting of the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission in Mauritius in 2003. This was followed by meetings in Zambia (the Livingstone I and II meetings), at which the technical and administrative aspects of the draft framework were discussed. At the next meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon, a declaration was produced and in the end entailed its endorsement at the ministerial meeting in Windhoek, Namibia in 2008.

Mr Anyanwu asked the audience to note that in the initial stages the SPF had set itself the task to compliment and supplement national and regional policies, such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The AU's initial aim was 'to promote sustainable development in Africa through a social framework'. However, this approach was questioned because it implied that social development was subordinate to economic development and growth.

The AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission had taken the lead in developing the Social Policy Framework draft document by drawing on the knowledge of experts from academia and from AU stakeholders. The draft document contained 18 key issues that had been set as priorities. These were population and development (with emphasis on

Africa's large youth population, shortage of employment and educational requirements), labour and unemployment, social protection (interventions for the impoverished), health care, migration (provisions for migrant workers), education, agriculture, family (given its important role in the African context), children, the disabled (physical disability only), gender equality and the empowerment of women, culture (an area of precedence in African societies), urbanisation (urban poverty), environmental sustainability, globalisation and trade, good governance, corruption and the rule of law. It was agreed that these priorities would in general coincide with the priorities of individual countries, although it was later demonstrated that some countries had their own set of priorities.

The discussion that followed the reading of the document was critical and engaging. The participants observed that although the AU had the finest policy documents, they tended to remain on the shelves; in other words, implementation continued to be a major challenge. Mr Anyanwu answered that the SPF not only had to face the challenge of implementation, but also had to overcome the matter of having the draft document accepted and endorsed by AU member states. It was important to give the AU its due credit for initiating discussion on a Social Policy Framework for Africa. However, it should be noted that the AU was not an implementing organ, but an organisation whose primary focus was to monitor member states' activities. It was therefore important for CSOs as 'citizens' to engage in the process of implementation, Mr Anyanwu said.



The second speaker in this session was Mr Warren Nyamugasira, Director, *African Monitor*, who summarised the three-stage development of the Social Policy Framework, namely the post-colonial stage, also called the nationalistic agenda; the structural adjustment stage, which represented the ideal of minimal state involvement in the economy and greater focus on free-market mechanisms; and the current era, which focused on state involvement in the promotion and development of economic growth, but with an important question being whether economic development should indeed precede social development.

Mr Nyamugasira next quoted some social policy success stories in Africa: five countries had committed 15 per cent of their national budgets to health, the per capita expenditure on health in 16 countries exceeded \$24, ten countries had abolished school tuition fees, and gender parity in schools had improved in some countries in the last 10 years. However, other factors continued to contribute to Africa's 'chronic poverty' condition, for example the heavy reliance on aid, grants and loans that rendered Africa's progress cyclical in the sense that progress may occur but dwindle after a given duration. In the light of these it was essential to recognise the importance of 'external factors' that affect the development of social policy. According to him, one third of Africa's population still experienced chronic poverty, which was a condition 'inherited' from generation to generation. African countries had also failed to reach pre-1975 levels of social service delivery. On the other hand, there were positive achievements, such as in the field of health where good progress was being made in the fight against malaria and HIV, even though both initiatives relied heavily on foreign capital. It was necessary to rank the priorities listed in the Social Policy Framework for effective engagement and to produce positive and sustainable results.

Professor Marius Olivier, a South African social security expert, next gave a brief overview on the scope of the Social Policy Framework and pointed to some gaps, such as 'insufficient treatment of labour market, standards and collective labour relations' and 'a deficient human rights protective framework'. Social protection, he said, was at the core of the Social Policy Framework and essentially included provisions for extending protection to the vulnerable, including women, children and the disabled. He substantiated his comments by analysing employment and unemployment, taking the informal sector into account, even though the latter was made

difficult by a number of factors, such as the prevalence of low labour standards. The informal sector, he added, had to be given priority because little attention or even a tendency to neglect this sector was manifest in government approaches. Current labour laws gave more emphasis to the formal sector.

Concerning issues labelled by him as 'social security imperatives', Prof. Olivier stressed the importance of considering a gender dimension, with women being represented and the challenges they faced in the labour market being addressed, for example female participation in the workforce, special considerations for maternity leave etc. He suggested that the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, in particular article 4.3, or the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), specifically article 4.1, which contained strong provisions for women, could be used as a guide. Due consideration should also be given to migrant workers, who receive inadequate social protection all over Africa. The AU Migration Policy Framework, modified for the social protection context but not yet implemented by member states, had reference.

His third analysis concerned the human rights protective framework, in particular the inadequate coverage of human rights in the Social Policy Framework. Though the SPF had provisions for human rights, enforcement had not yet been fully executed. Another issue he considered important was a distinct classification of CSOs. Some organisations were engaged in children's rights, others in issues such as gender, trade unions and the like. Social security issues pertaining to the areas of work of specific CSOs should be directed to those bodies for handling.

The debate that followed addressed the issue of whether economic development should precede social development. Although Africa did not lack resources, strategic planning for the utilisation of these resources was inadequate. There was some agreement with the recommendation to increase taxation on citizens, but participants warned about the lack of political will in some countries and the setbacks that had been experienced with the implementation of taxation systems, both as regards the formal and informal sectors. Some participants proposed that the idea of African product development be promoted and that more emphasis be given to the agricultural sector. To realise the aims of the Social Policy Framework it was crucial that consideration be given the role of African women, who held African society together.

Finally, there was a critical discussion on the ‘dilemma’ and ‘contradiction’ in the draft framework document. In the executive summary it was stated that ‘the framework treats social development as subordinate to economic growth, but justifies social development as a goal in its own right’. However, in the document itself it was stated that ‘... policy for social development as a broader goal should be coordinated with but not subordinate to economic growth and political development.’ Participants argued that human welfare and collective wellbeing were the most important issues in the African context.

The following three main notions emerged from the discussion:

- The draft document should be abandoned in total.
- The draft document should be revised before endorsement is sought to deal with the contradictions.
- The draft document should be retained as is and be used as an opportunity to engage.

Recommendations

- The economic paradigm should be extended to ward off the notion that social development is subservient to economic development.
- Mobilisation of resources at national level to fund social development should be supported. This could take the form of increased taxation. Although this might assist countries to rid themselves of the burdensome welfare system the question arises how it will be possible to instil the idea of even greater taxation upon an African population plagued by poverty.



- The idea of increasing taxation to achieve Social Policy Framework aims should be retained, but such taxation should take into consideration the realities of the current situation of Africa’s predominantly poor population.
- Strategies should be developed to enable critical studies to be undertaken of government budgets for the purpose of achieving expenditure adjustments that will release funds for social development.
- CSOs should seek involvement in deliberations on the Social Policy Framework. Heads of state could benefit from the expertise of CSOs.
- CSOs should forge links amongst themselves internally as opposed to the current trend of mainly engaging with foreign or external partners, *inter alia* for reasons of funding.
- Debates on the SPF should be initiated at local and national levels, taking due cognisance of the gaps in representation by, for example, the informal sector.
- The work of self-help groups should be facilitated and small-scale economic activity should be supported.
- Formal organisations that can take the lead as far as the Social Policy Framework is concerned need to be set up, and attention should be drawn to the fact that although labour law standards have witnessed development, more ‘encouragement’ is required in this regard.
- The AU should deal adequately with the lack of effective policy implementation.
- Assuming that the AU endorses the Social Policy Framework, member states should develop national strategies based on their own priorities.
- The AU Economic and Social Affairs Department requires strategic planning assistance to help it with the implementation of projects and to follow up on progress.
- The Pan-African Parliament, which is referred to in the Social Policy Framework, should be transformed into a legislative organ and act as an implementing body to enhance social policy development in Africa.

In closing, the chairman of the afternoon session, Dr Emmanuel Akwetey, Director of Ghana’s Institute for Democratic Governance, said that it was common cause among participants that the AU had not achieved enough, but that it had the ability to become an effective organ should the required transformation occur. This would be a real challenge in itself. He acknowledged the task at hand for CSOs to exert influence on the AU.

CSO coordination

Under the facilitation of Dr Emmanuel Akwetey, the first speaker of the second day was Mr Yves Niyiragira, Editor, *AU Monitor*, Fahamu Network for Social Justice, Kenya, who addressed the topic 'CSO coordination challenges at the continental level'. Mr Niyiragira acknowledged the work done by the CCP-AU to establish links between CSOs and the AU. Although this coordination effort was still in the early stages, the end goal was to increase the AUs engagement with the people of the continent. A major hindrance in the realisation of a strong link between the AU and CSOs had been the lack of a mechanism to collate and disseminate information on discussions at conferences. In addition to this, there exists a lack of ownership and sense of not belonging to the AU among the broader spectrum of the African population. However, as a result of efforts by the CCP-AU some progress had been made with regard to the regularity of meetings. One of the main functions of the CCP-AU was to facilitate debate on CSO engagement with the AU. Mr Niyiragira commended the AU for attempting to enhance citizen participation through organs such as NEPAD, which was a change from its predecessor, the OAU.

On a less positive note, he said that despite undertakings by the AU, the majority of Africans did not see the AU as an organ working for their interests. There was a lack of ownership and a sense of not belonging to the AU among the broader spectrum of the African population. The CSOs had relatively poor representation at the AU, rendering them 'passive actors' concerning decisions taken by the organisation.

Mr Niyiragira suggested that ECOSOCC could be a means for CSO-AU engagement, but this would only come about if ECOSOCC abandoned the restrictive strategies it had adopted (i.e. membership requirements). Addressing

the question of participation in discourse and CSO representation of the wider masses, he said that this could be achieved by encouraging participation by social movements, including, for instance, farmer's associations, feminist movements, faith-based institutions and trade unions. In conclusion, Mr Niyiragira asked for the broadening of CSO engagement with the AU and cited his own organisation, Fahamu, which had established strong links with the AU by acting as a conduit for AU information. Another good example, he said, was the Africa's Peoples Forum, which had been set up with an aim of forging links between the people of Africa and African legislative bodies.

The second presenter was Ms Yemisrach Kebede, Director Centre for Citizens' Participation in the African Union (CCP-AU), who spoke on the necessity to 'strategise ways of working' - with the aim of forging strong CSO-AU engagement. According to her it was essential that the CCP-AU's role be institutionalised formally so that the AU's engagement with the African population could be discussed. The method of recruiting members onto the CCP-AU should also be formalised. The coordinated engagement of CSOs at the continental level would improve the chances of realising CCP-AU goals. Ms Kebede briefly discussed the objectives of CCP-AU, which included conducting, coordinating and facilitating CSO participation in the AU, empowering CSOs so that its contributions would not remain behind closed doors etc.

Discussions and recommendations

- Member states of the AU should put pressure on the organisation to deal with governments that violate the rights of citizens, i.e. Sudan.

- The AU should adopt a more professional perspective and cut back on bureaucracies that in effect hinder the development of Africa as a whole.
- As long as there is no 'real' CSO-AU engagement, not much progress in attempts to alleviate Africa's problems can be expected, at least not in the short term.
- Each African country should make a commitment to enhance the growth of the CCP-AU. Strong participation could further the cause of engagement substantively.
- Africans should come together, take ownership and formulate workable and sustainable resolutions for the continent.
- The unity of the people of Africa is vital for achieving the strategic vision of Pan-Africanism.
- CSOs should adopt strategies to engage with the AU through discussions and put in place effective follow-up mechanisms to ensure that decisions taken the AU are implemented.
- Effective use should be made of the media to spread information to the public on the AU's deliberations and decisions. In addition, CSO-AU engagement should be substantiated by participating in proceedings of ongoing consultative meetings.
- Participants were in agreement that the process of engagement had been initiated. However, further progress would depend on further input from each individual participant.



Closing session and adoption of CSO communiqué

The final activity of the conference was to evaluate the discussions and recommendations, and to adopt the final communiqué. In closing, Ms Yemisrach Kebede thanked the participants for making the conference a success

through their active participation. She encouraged each CSO representative to advocate the issues raised in an endeavour to influence the decisions that would be made at the forthcoming 12th African Union Summit.

Participants

Title	Name	Organisation
Mr.	Bhekinkosi MOYO	Trust Africa SAT
Mr.	Albaqir Alafif MUKHTAR	Arab Program for Human Rights (APHRA) OXFAM
Mr.	Haggag A . M. NAYIL	Arab Program for Human Rights (APHRA) OXFAM
Mr.	Ahmed Ali	Human Rights Association for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRAAP)
Ms.	Chizya MVULA	Ministry of Energy and Water Development
Mr.	Voke Ighorodje	World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP)
Ms.	Katherine BOOTH	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	M. DIALLO	Organisation guinéenne des droits de l'Homme (OGDH), member of FIDH
Mr.	Mabassa FALL	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	Florent GEEL	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	Dismas KITENGE SENGA	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	Marceau SIMIEUDE	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	Arnold TSUNGA	International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Mr.	Alioune TINE	RADDHO
Mr.	Tim Muriithi	U. of Bradford
Mr.	Nabil AbdulHafidh Maged Ebrahim	Social Democratic Forum
Ms.	Gugulethu Moyo	International Bar Association
Mr.	Gabriel Shumba	Zimbabwe Exiles Forum / sponsored by Freedom House
Mr.	Useni Sibanda	Zimbabwe Christian Alliance / sponsored by Freedom House
Mrs.	Roseline Zigomo	Freedom House South Africa
Mr.	Clever Chikwanda	Action for Conflict Transformation
Mrs.	Sandiswe Qweni	Action for Conflict Transformation
Mr.	Paul Wjik (at Beshale)	OXFAM NOVIB

Title	Name	Organisation
Mrs.	Eve Odete (at Beshale)	OXFAM
	Irungu Houghton (at Beshale)	OXFAM
Mr.	Dismas Nkunde (at Beshale)	OXFAM
Mr.	Steve Lamony (at Beshale)	
Mrs.	Blessing Gorejena	Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum
Mr.	Yves Niyiragira	FAHAMU
Mr	Nixon Nyikadzion	Crisis in Zimbabwe coalition / sponsored by Freedom House
Mrs.	Teresa Pearyl Mugadza	
Mr.	Tor Hugne Olsen	
Mrs.	Naisola Likimani	OXFAM PA
Mrs.	Joy Muniyiri	OXFAM PA
Mr.	Noel Kututwa	
Mr.	Warren NYAMUGASIRA	African Monitor
Mrs.	Jamila Abdellaoui	ISS Ethiopia
Mr.	Elias Meseret	Crown Publishing
Mr.	Haileab Meressa	Peace journey in Africa 2000 promotion
Mr.	Moges Amdeselassie	Association for Environmental Development in Ethiopia (AEDE)
Mrs.	Lina ABDULLAHI	Institute of peace and security AAU
Mr.	Yohannes Mezegebe	Pan African Youth Union (suggested by Olive Sampson US embassy)
Ms.	Firehiwot Demissie	African Youth Association
Mr.	Ras Mesfin	CRIA(collective responsible initiative Association)
Mr.	Hailu Hagos G/Meskel	All rounded dev't and capacity bldg association
Mr.	Hallelujah L. Wondimu	U Peace
Mr.	Kinetibeb Kassa/Heran	OSJE
Mr.	Derese Gethachew	AAU
Mr.	Jeba Adugna	African Youth dream Association
Ms.	Mahlet Ayele	African Youth Association
Mr.	yilma Boru	Ministry of Womens' Affairs
Ms.	Timnit Abraha	IAG
Mr	Belayneh Begajo	Action Aid
Mr.	Warren Nyamugasira	African Monitor (South Africa)
Mrs.	Tamrat Yirgu	World Vision
Mr.	Jean-Pierre Fallet	ICRC Ethiopia
Mr	Chikezie Anyanwu	SCF Alliance

Participants

Title	Name	Organisation
Mr	Yabowork	Accord ethiopia
Mr	Abraham Kumela	CRDA
Ms.	Elisabeth Mengistu	Afroflag
	Salome Katia	Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace – AMANI Forum
	Ayokunle Fagbemi	Center for Peacebuilding and Socio-Economic Resources Development [CePSERD]
	Emmanuel Akwetey	Institute for democratic governance
	Cecile Djuma Faila Shada	Societe civile di Congo
	Lisette Banza	
	Tsirisoa Nantenaina Rakotonimaro	FES/COALITION PAYSANNE DE MADAGASCAR
	Tanteliniaina Victor Rakotoarison	FES/Comité National d'Observation des Elections (KMF-CNOE-
	Education Des Citoyens)	
	Rasolofonandrasana Stephan Razafindehibe	FES/L'EXPRESS DE MADAGASCAR
	Hantanirina Andrianasy	FES/FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG MADAGASCAR
	Harinony Lucien Razafindraibe	FES/Syndicat general maritime de Madagascar
	Njekwa Mate Unsure	FES/CENTRE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE (CPD
	Lalao Randriamampionona	National NGOs forum
	Marius Olivier	FES
	Austin Muneku	FES/ Zambia Congress of trade Unions